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1. The extended cognition thesis 
 
The target of this paper is the extended cognition thesis (EC). According to EC, in 
certain circumstances, many of our cognitive processes and cognitive systems are 
distributed not only across various regions of the brain but also across non-neural 
bodily and environmental parts (Clark 1997, 2008; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Menary 
2007; Sutton 2010; Wheeler 2010).  
When addressing questions and issues pertinent to EC, there are at least two 
explanatory targets one must be careful to distinguish between. The first is the 
assembly process involved in orchestrating an extended cognitive process or an 
extended cognitive system. I refer to this as the process of cognitive assembly (the 
process of CA). Notice that when addressing the process of CA, we may ask over 
which timescales, and by which principles, different entities (e.g., certain neural 
operations, saccadic eye movements, cultural practices, tools) jointly combine to put 
together or compose a temporally distributed cognitive process and/or system. The 
other target concerns the newly assembled device once it has been assembled or 
composed. I call this the product of cognitive assembly (the product of CA). In 
relation to the product of CA, we may ask questions about the difference in properties 
between the various parts, how information flows and its propagated between the 
different parts, and how it is that an extended cognitive system instantiates such 
“processes in ways that ideally solve some problem.” (Clark 2008, p. 122)  
In this paper, I focus on a recent debate in EC between Clark (2008, 2011) and 
Hutchins (2011a) concerning the process of CA. My independent motivation for this 
are twofold: first, to sort out some of the positions one might take in this discussion 
between Clark and Hutchins; and second to defend that at least one of those choices 
marks a step towards a third-wave version of EC.  
2. Towards a third wave of EC: Setting up the arguments 
 
When addressing the process of CA, what I call the usual account is as follows: Only 
processes operating in the here-and-now are responsible for the process of CA and 
such processes are primarily bodily and neural processes. Prominent advocates of this 
view include Clark (2008, 2011) and Clark & Chalmers (1998). I should add that the 
usual account of EC is what has recently been referred to as first-wave EC. Defenders 
of first wave EC ground their arguments for EC on the ideas that (i) external artifacts 
are incorporated into the cognitive system of an individual in virtue of the right kind 
of causal coupling, and (ii) functional similarity between the causal roles of internal 
and external occupiers. Alternatively to first-wave EC, defenders of second-wave EC 
go beyond parity and focus instead on complementarity between internal and external 
states and properties (Sutton 2010) and their consequent integration into a cognitive 
whole (Menary 2007).  
 In this paper, I explore one possible route by which to gesture at but also argue 
for a third wave version of EC. Specifically, I follow work by second-wave EC 
theorists, whom are driving particular visions for a third wave of EC. In particular, I 
propose one approach to the process of CA that exemplifies Sutton’s recent gesture 
towards a third wave of EC: a version “which dissolves individuals into peculiar loci 
of coordination and coalescence among multiple structured media [and practices].” 
(2010, p. 213) This suggestion, I believe, echoes what Menary has recently called 
“enculturated cognition” (EnC). EnC is the “idea that our cognitive abilities are 
transformed by a cognitive species of cultural practices […]. What we are able to do 
is augmented and transformed by the acquisition of cognitive practices.” (2012, p. 
148) Both of these versions for a third-wave of EC theorizing emphasize the 
deconstruction of the individual organism as the locus of the process of CA and allow 
for cultural practices as playing a central role in close coordination with neural and 
bodily processes.  
 In this paper, I aim to unpack this articulation of a third wave in the extended 
cognition thesis in a way that has not been done before. That is, I will discuss the 
process of CA in conjunction with work on the relation of composition in 
metaphysics. I should add that even though the debate about the process of CA is not 
strictly speaking about the metaphysics of composition, those involved in the 
discussions over CA ask structurally similar questions to those involved in debates 
about composition in metaphysics. In debates over composition, what is known as the 
special composition question (SCQ) (van Inwagen 1990) concerns the circumstances 
under which entities assemble or compose another entity. Indeed, both the process of 
CA and SCQ ask questions concerning the conditions under which entities combine to 
compose or assemble another entity (or whole). In so doing, both the SCQ and the 
process of CA take as their target the Xs – the constituents – that compose or 
assemble Y, and analyze the conditions under which the Xs come together to 
compose or assemble Y.  
 The first argument that I will develop turns on the fact that composition is 
understood as a synchronic relation of dependence, and that such a synchronic notion 
of composition (the SCQ) is inconsistent with the temporal dynamics inherent in the 
process of CA. To make this claim, I aim to establish that the restriction of the verb 
“compose” in the expression “the Xs compose Y” to the present tense is 
metaphysically problematic when considering the nature of time continuous processes 
such as those involved in the process of CA. This picture, familiar as it is, of X (or the 
Xs) composing Y at an instant t, finds no corresponding image in contemporary 
debates about the process of CA. In fact, when Clark states that his own targets in 
Supersizing the Mind (2008) are processes operating in the here-and-now, nowhere 
does Clark’s temporal quantification “here-and-now” adhere to the assumption that 
the verb “compose” must be understood to imply “compose at an instant t”. 
Consequently, serious inquiry into the kinship between the process of CA and the 
SCQ must begin by scrutinizing the actual meaning of the term “now” as it is used to 
express the claim “the Xs compose Y now or in the here-and-now”. What I shall 
argue is that the process of CA must be stated without implicating a notion of 
composing or assembling that is synchronic, where “synchronic” means that the Xs 
are composing Y at this very instant t. This is important, since I will show that only 
by problematizing the notion of synchronic composition is it possible to provide a 
properly motivated answer to the process of CA. That is where the metaphysical 
action lies in this paper
1
.  
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 What I do not claim is that arguments for the process of CA assume a synchronic 
conception of composition or assembly. It is the usual accounts of composition in 
analytical metaphysics that presuppose that composition holds in a synchronic 
manner. What I do claim is that scrutinizing the meaning of “now” both in the debate 
The second argument considers the debate between Clark and Hutchins on the process 
of CA, with the aim of establishing that as soon as we leave room for the non-trivial 
role of cultural practices in the process of CA – even when the processes unfold in the 
here-and-now – this requires that we must look beyond the system made up of the 
individual agent and artifact. That is, we must include into our explanation of the 
process of CA features such as cognitive norms (Menary 2007) and patterned 
(cultural) practices (Hutchins 2011; Menary 2007; Roepstorff et al. 2010). By the end 
of the paper what I hope to have shown is that developing a diachronic or temporally 
dynamic ontology for the process of CA lends support for a third wave of EC.  
 
3. Overview 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 4, I consider difficulties with 
giving a satisfactory answer to the qualification that the verb “compose” is to be 
understood in the present tense – i.e., as right now some Xs are composing or 
assembling some Y. In section 5, I make use of the outcome of my discussion in 
section 4 to discuss one of Clark’s examples of the process of CA, namely Gray & 
Fu’s (2004) studies on the soft-assembly of interactive microstrategies employed by 
the brain to solve a given problem. In section 6, I consider the debate between 
Hutchins and Clark on the process of CA, where I draw up the battle lines and discuss 
the possibility that Clark might be wrong in privileging bodily and neural processes 
when explaining the process of CA
2
. In the final section, I tease out several 
implications of the discussion in this paper.    
                                                                                                                                                              
over the process of CA and in analytical metaphysics may shed light on how (a) to 
understand the meaning of “now” in debates concerning composition, and (b) to 
further develop the project of establishing a framework for a third-wave of EC.  
2
 Some readers may find it a controversial claim to state that Clark privileges bodily 
and neural processes when explaining the process of CA. However, in his most recent 
book, Supersizing the Mind (2008), Clark endorses the following position when 
discussing the process of CA: “Human cognitive processing (sometimes) literally 
extends into the environment surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within 
the organism, the brain/CNS) remains the core and currently most active element. 
Cognition is organism centered even when it is not organism bound.” (Clark 2008, p. 
4. Discussing the terms “now”, “right now” and “here-and-now”
 3
  
 
Under what circumstances do a collection of entities compose some further entity? As 
we saw in section 2, this is van Inwagen’s SCQ (1990). Some answer never (Rosen & 
Dorr 2002), some say sometimes, yet only sometimes (Markosian 1998; Merricks 
2001; van Inwagen 1990), whereas some say always (Lewis 1986; Sider 2001). In this 
section, I do not consider any of these options for when (or if) composition holds. 
Instead, I start by considering difficulties with providing a satisfactory answer to the 
assumption that the verb “compose” in the expression “the Xs jointly combine to 
compose Y” is to be understood as meaning “right now, the Xs jointly combine to 
compose Y”.  
Consider, for example, what van Inwagen writes about tense and composition in 
Material Beings, as he says:  
 
“The verb ‘compose’ in the predicate ‘the xs compose y’ is to be understood as 
being in the present tense, and the same point applies to ‘are’ in ‘are parts of’. 
Thus, ‘are parts of’ and ‘compose’ should be read ‘are now parts of’ and ‘now 
compose’. Strictly speaking […], our definiendum should have been ‘the xs 
compose y at t’, and our “primitive” mereological predicate should have been ‘x 
is a part of y at t.” (1990, p. 29; italics in original)  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
139) Or, as Clark puts the point a few pages earlier: “It is indeed primarily (though 
not solely) the biological organism that, courtesy especially of its potent neural 
apparatus, spins and maintains (or more minimally selects and exploits) the webs of 
additional structure that then form parts of the machinery that accomplishes its own 
cognizing.” (2008, p. 123) These two quotes are indicative of Clark’s Hypothesis of 
Organism Centered Cognition, and is what I mean by the claim that Clark privileges 
bodily and neural processes when addressing the process of CA. But, of course, this 
does not imply that the Hypothesis of Organism Centered Cognition is inconsistent 
with EC. Indeed, Clark’s position on the product of CA is precisely that certain 
systems are distributed across neural, bodily, and environmental resources. 
3
 I use the terms “now”, “right now” and “here-and-now” interchangeably throughout 
this paper.  
On this view, for the Xs to compose Y now is to claim that the Xs compose Y at t. By 
my lights, this is a rather elusive way to characterize the idea of “now” in relation to 
composition, because it leaves it an open question whether van Inwagen means either 
(a) that composition is a relation between the Xs and Y at time t, where the extension 
of t may include a short interval of time, or (b) that composition is a relation between 
the Xs and Y at a momentary instant, where the extension of t does not include an 
interval of time but denotes a durationless point in time. However, consider what 
Bennett says about composition in her survey of metaphysical dependence relations: 
“Composition is a synchronic or atemporal many-one relation […].” (2011, p. 81) 
Furthermore, the usual account of composition depicts composition as a vertical 
relation of dependence between Xs and Y, where ‘vertical determination’ must be 
understood to exclude ‘horizontal determination’ (Bennett, forthcoming; Kim 2005). 
Put differently, if there is a relation of vertical determination between some Xs and a 
Y, then that relation of determination does not unfold across an interval of time – 
where horizontal determination represents diachronic (temporal) causal relations. The 
usual account of composition – in metaphysics as well as the metaphysics of science – 
turns on the presupposition that composition is a relation that holds at a durationless 
instant.  
 Prima facie, at least, it seems to me that ordinary folk are quite familiar with the 
idea of “now” or “right now”. For instance, when we talk about something presently 
taking place such as executing a tennis serve, engaging in a conversation with a 
friend, stirring the pasta sauce, and so on, we (implicitly) appeal to the temporal fact 
that something – which we may or may not engage in – is happening or taking place 
right now. If the folk are right, which they may or may not be, it would make the set 
of events to which the term “now” applies include events the temporal duration of 
which takes place over milliseconds, seconds, and minutes. It may only take me a few 
seconds to stir the pasta sauce, but it may take me several minutes to execute the 
proper chess move vis-à-vis the situation on the chessboard
4
.  
 In metaphysics things are different from that of the folk. To facilitate our 
discussion, consider that Markosian (2004) mentions that it is possible to distinguish 
between two different senses of the notion “X exists now”. The first sense is what 
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 I should point out the duration of “now” is also discussed in the philosophy of time 
consciousness under the heading of the specious present.  
Markosian calls for the temporal location sense, where the expression “X exists now” 
is meant to be synonymous with “X is present”. This is the received view of 
presentism in the philosophy of time (Markosian 2004). The second sense of “X 
exists now”, Markosian calls for the ontological sense. On this ontological sense, the 
expression “X exists now” is understood as shorthand for the claim that X “is now in 
the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether it is present, like you and me, 
or non-present, like Socrates.” (Markosian 2004, p. 48) This is the view commonly 
expressed as non-presentism or eternalism (Sider 2001). Presentism and non-
presentism make competing claims about temporal ontology (Sider 2006). Presentism 
is the view that, necessarily, it is always true that only present entities exist, whereas 
non-presentism is often formulated in an atemporal language that is hostile to 
presentism (Sider 2001). That is, on the non-presentist view, past and future entities, 
such as dinosaurs and me 10 years from today, all exist. However, for the presentist, 
but not the non-presentist, there is something ontologically special about the now, in 
the sense that only entities that are currently present, exist.  
For my purposes here, it matters little whether presentism or non-presentism is 
ultimately true, in that, all I wish to highlight is that both of these (hotly debated) 
doctrines in metaphysics are equally elusive when it comes to pinning down the 
precise meaning of the notion “now” as the above given definition by van Inwagen 
(1990). First, the presentist states that only present entities exist. But what might this 
claim amount to in the context of cognitive science? Consider, for instance, the 
Hodgkin & Huxley (1952) model of the action potential discussed in Craver (2007).  
Action potentials consist of both rapid and fleeting changes in what is known as 
the electrical potential difference in a neuron’s membrane. This electrical potential 
difference (measured as the voltage difference across the membrane) is known as the 
membrane potential. The membrane potential consists of a separation of charged ions 
on either side of the membrane (cf. Craver 2007, p. 50). As Craver specifies: “In the 
neuron’s resting state, positive ions line up against the extracellular surface. In typical 
cells, this arrangement establishes a polarized resting potential (Vrest) of –60 mV to –
70 mV […]. In an action potential, the membrane becomes fleetingly permeable to 
sodium (Na
+
) and potassium (K
+
). This allows the ions to diffuse rapidly across the 
cell membrane.” (2007, p. 50) This rapid diffusion changes the mV, in that, the action 
potential consists of (i) a quick increase in mV to a maximum of +35 mV, which is 
followed by (ii) a rapid decrease in mV to certain values below the so-called Vrest, 
followed by (iii) a prolonged or extended after-potential period during which the 
neuron is less excitable (cf. Craver 2007, p. 50)  
Unconventional as this example might be in discussions over presentism, the 
question I wish to consider goes to the very heart of the ambiguity of how to 
understand “present” or “now”. That is, is the action potential present in the presentist 
sense? Let us start with the (arguably) uncontroversial assumption that insofar as an 
action potential is present now (whatever we take “now” and “present” to imply), the 
action potential requires for it to be present that it unfolds over a region of space-time. 
That this is uncontroversial follows from the brute fact that an action potential 
irreducibly consists of (i), (ii), and (iii) – that is, of (i) a quick increase in mV to a 
maximum of +35 mV, (ii) a rapid decrease in mV to certain values below the so-
called Vrest, and (iii) a prolonged or extended after-potential period during which the 
neuron is less excitable (cf. Craver 2007, p. 50) – and the manifestation of any of 
these three stages or parts take time (measured in milliseconds). The presentist is 
committed to the ontological claim that only present entities exist. However, consider 
some event – the rapid rise in mV to a maximum value of approximately +35 mV – 
that is happening right now. Too late! That event is over, in the sense that the mV is 
already rapidly declining to a value below Vrest. If we take seriously that it is only 
present entities that exist, it follows that the first stage of the action potential in now 
entirely in the past. However, according to the presentist, everything that is either in 
the past or in the future (or both) does not strictly speaking exist; only entities that are 
present exist now.  
I do not intend this to be a refutation of presentism; however, if this is indeed one 
possible outcome of presentism, it gives rise to a counter-intuitive situation: that the 
first stage that the action potential consists of is not – or, on longer – part of the action 
potential because of the fact that the mV is presently on the decline. Furthermore, 
what is now part of the action potential – for example, stage two – will, in a very short 
period of time, cease to be a part of the action potential because it will be entirely in 
the past. For the cognitive scientist as well as philosophers of cognitive science this 
result, I suspect, will be unbelievable. For example, in mechanistic philosophy of 
cognitive science (Bechtel 2008; Craver 2007; Machamer et al. 2000), lower-level 
components and their activity give rise to higher-level functioning in virtue of the 
components being organized in a certain temporal, spatial as well as causal 
organization. But, the components themselves will not cease to be part of some 
higher-level phenomenon or mechanism, because they operate over different temporal 
frequencies.  
Non-presentism will do no better for my purposes, especially because non-
presentism is stated tenselessly or timelessly, thus completely ignoring one of the 
central principles of research across cognitive neuroscience (Engel et al. 2001), 
cognitive psychology (Ballard et al. 1997; Spivey 2007) as well as dynamical and 
embodied approaches to cognition (Clark 1997; Gibson 1979; van Gelder 1998; 
Varela et al. 1991; Wheeler 2005; and others), namely that cognition happens in time 
(not in some atemporal or timeless vacuum), and that time constrains and limits the 
production of cognitive activity. Wheeler captures this emphasis on temporality 
nicely, as he states:  
 
“In the psychological arena, such phenomena [i.e., temporally rich phenomena] 
include (i) the rates of change within, the actual temporal duration of, and any 
rhythmic properties exhibited by, individual cognitive processes, and (ii) the 
ways in which those rates change, temporal durations, and rhythms are 
synchronized both with the corresponding temporal phenomena exhibited by 
other cognitive processes, and the temporal processes taking place in the 
cognizer’s body and her environment.” (2005, p. 106)  
 
The central problem with both the standard synchronic notion of composition, on the 
one hand, and the doctrines of presentism and non-presentism, on the other, is that 
none make concessions to the fact that time is continuous (Spivey 2007): one that 
impedes the treatment of time in terms of arbitrary, discrete step time (t1, t2, etc.).  
The standard composition theorist, however, is a synchronic composition theorist 
in that he/she accepts that the primitive “X exists at time (or temporal interval) t” 
implies ontological synchronicity with respect to t. That is, the synchronic 
composition theorist claims that if X exists at t and if X is part of Y, then X is part of 
Y at t – this will be so no matter how continuous or discontinuous, transient or 
durable the interval and sub-intervals may be.  
This practice of casting the temporal conditions under which X (or the Xs) 
composes Y into some lockstep or stepwise progression (t1, t2, etc.), involving a 
sequence of discrete states – such that X1 composes Y1 at t1, X2 composes Y2 at t2, 
and so on, until tn – highlights an important difference between temporally complex 
forms of composition (as in the process of CA) and the kind of composition most 
metaphysicians have in mind. To further highlight this difference, consider the 
following example of returning a tennis serve, in van Gelder & Port:  
 
“The ball is approaching; you are perceiving its approach, are aware of the other 
player’s movements, are considering the best strategy for the return, and are 
shifting into position to play the stroke. All this is happening at the same time. 
As you move into place, your perspective on the approaching ball is changing 
and hence so is activity on your retina and in your visual system … the path of 
the approaching ball affects which strategy would be best and how you move. 
Everything is simultaneously affecting everything else.” (1995, p. 23; italics in 
original) 
 
In this example, claiming that a system S instantiates Y (returning a tennis serve), and 
Y is composed of some particular Xs, at a particular point in time t, really boils down 
to saying that during that period of time Y was composed of the Xs (or, Y was 
composed by the Xs). Keep in mind that we have independent reasons for being 
suspicious about the term “temporal instant t”. Consequently, in the process of CA, 
we should go on to define the relationship between parts and whole as follows: over 
some period of time, the Xs jointly compose Y, and over that period of time, none of 
the Xs completely overlap Y.  
 With respect to the notion that either Y or X (or both) exists right now, the 
standard construal of composition, which implies that “now” or “right now” is to be 
understood in terms of ontological synchronicity is fundamentally ill-equipped for the 
analysis of complex and dynamical phenomena such as the example of returning a 
tennis serve and the temporal trajectory of an action potential. That is, nothing in the 
standard account of composition allows for continuous processes unfolding in real 
time. And both returning a tennis serve and the manifestation of an action potential 
are processes that unfold continuously (over a certain time-course) in real time. Clark 
provides the following definition of a continuous process:  
 
“A continuous process is one in which the time-series of explanatorily relevant 
sub-states cannot be reduced to a sequence of discrete states with jumps in 
between, but instead requires a genuine continuum of states.” (1998, 356)  
In the tennis example, it makes little sense to insist that Y is composed wholly within 
and only within each particular sub-interval of t and that each transition from one sub-
interval to the next involves a complete transition of X and Y such that both X and Y 
are wholly present within one and only one particular sub-interval at a time
5
.  
Similarly in the debate about CA, I submit. For example, when Clark adopts the 
short-term timescales of the here-and-now to explore just how the brain participates in 
what (from the perspective of EC) are new distributed cognitive products, Clark wants 
to analyze which neural and bodily processes assemble temporally distributed wholes 
right now. Indeed, as Clark mentions: “In depicting the processes of on-the-spot 
recruitment and exploitation as neurally-centered, I meant only to stress the pivotal 
role, on all these shorter time-scales, of the specifically neural changes that immersion 
in those cultural practices presumably inculcate.” (2011, p. 459) For instance, in 
Supersizing the Mind (2008), most of the case studies referred to by Clark are studies 
that emphasize the short-term, but varied, temporal scales of bodily and neural 
operations – timescales that unfolds over courses of 50 to 300 milliseconds.  
In contrast to the standard view of composition in metaphysics, when Clark states 
that it is the processes, which operate in the here-and-now that assemble (or, 
compose) distributed ensembles, what Clark is actually saying is that it is the short-
term timescales over which most neural and bodily processes operate that during that 
short period of time assembled or put together some distributed cognitive whole.  
Here it is enlightening to consider that the use of “right now” in the process of 
CA is closely related to how the folk consider the notion “right now”. In EC, 
occurrent distributed cognitive wholes are considered to temporally unfold 
everywhere from 50 milliseconds and up to a few hours in the case of occurrent 
emotions and extended instances of decision-making. Similarly, and as I argued 
above, if the folk are right, then the term “right now” would refer to occurrences 
ranging from 2-3 minutes in their entirety to 200-300 milliseconds. That is, from 
processes involved in complex decision making to the completion of one saccadic eye 
movement. Furthermore, as with most (if not all) processes, cognitive processes have 
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 As Spivey mentions: “Real time does not function like a digital computer’s clock. It 
does not move forward and then stop to be counted, and then move forward again 
only to stop again. At the level of human behavior, real time does not have an 
objective functional unit.” (2007, p. 30) 
subprocesses as well as subphases. For example, the typical time span of a single 
episode of voluntary biographical remembering is roughly 10 seconds and this 
trajectory can have any number of both continuous and discontinuous sub-phases and 
sub-processes. Thus, just as the processes making up a tennis serve return, the 
processes and subprocesses that compose a token episode of voluntary biographical 
remembering are time continuous – that is, both cases involve continuous processes, 
and continuous processes and their relevant subprocesses as well as subphases cannot 
be reduced to a sequence of discrete states instantiated within a discrete temporal slice 
of time. This is idea is nicely expressed by Spivey, who says:  
 
“[Claiming] that a system was in a particular “state,” X, at a particular point in 
time, really boils down to saying that the average of the system’s states during 
that period of time was X. This kind of coarse averaging measurement is often a 
practical necessity in science, but should not be mistaken as genuine evidence 
for the system actually resting in a discrete stable state.” (2007, p. 30; bold and 
italics in original)  
 
It is, of course, possible to distinguish conceptually between long-term evolutionary 
timescales, time-scales running over developmental and/or cultural-historical time, 
and the short-term timescales of hours, seconds, and milliseconds (see e.g., Clark 
2011)
6
. But, regardless of how we conceptually carve up time, time is, I submit, 
continuous (Clark 1998; Port & van Gelder 1995; Spivey 2007). Indeed, it seems 
highly unlikely that the components assembled on the spot to complete a tennis serve 
return function in what van Gelder & Port call arbitrary step time (t1, t2, etc.). That 
each new second or millisecond (or smaller) signaled, as Spivey puts it “an 
instantaneous and simultaneous updating of the discrete state of each and every unit 
                                                        
6 But these conceptual distinctions may not apply objectively. As Smart (1963), for 
instance, argues against the A-theory of time, according to which “past”, “present” 
and “future” are understood to objectively apply to the universe, Smart argues that 
this way of carving up time is an entirely anthropocentric account of time. That is, 
distinctions of past, present, and future are distinctions made from a particular 
(human) point of view (Smart 1963, p. 132; see also Sider 2001; for an overview of 
the A-theory of time, see e.g., Mellor 1998) 
in the system.” (2007, p. 30; italics in original) This complaint applies to the standard 
view of synchronic composition, in that, this standard view delineates time into 
discrete chunks with jumps in between them. In the standard cases, the Xs compose or 
assemble Y only if the Xs and Y are wholly present at each particular instant in time 
at which they exist (cf. van Inwagen 1990).  
The problem, in short, is that even though both the SCQ and the process of CA 
address the question ‘under which circumstances, and by which principles’ do certain 
entities compose or assemble other entities, the SCQ is formulated synchronically 
and, therefore, leaves out the temporal dynamics of actually occurring instances of 
composition. What we really need is a temporally quantified version of the SCQ; call 
it the Temporal Special Composition Question (TSCQ). Unlike the SCQ, the TSCQ 
does not presuppose a temporal restriction on the verb “compose” or on the verb 
“assemble” such that these would imply “compose or assemble at this very instant”. 
Instead, the TSCQ asks the question “over which timescales do processes operate 
when they jointly compose (or, assemble) a whole?”  
In addition, “wholes” may be temporary and a one-off ensemble, a temporary and 
repeatable one, or something more permanent (cf. Wilson & Clark 2009). Whether it 
is one or the other is an empirical question – not a question to be settled by 
metaphysical analysis.  
If I am right that the claim “the Xs compose or assemble Y right now”, at least 
when considering time continuous processes, is an abstraction and should not be 
mistaken as evidence for the claim that some Xs assemble Y at an ontologically 
synchronic instant, then the evaluation of empirical evidence supporting my claim 
must be sensitive to this fact. Fortunately, the empirical evidence is sensitive to this 
fact. Here, then, is another difference between the understanding of “time” in the 
standard account of composition, on the one hand, and the kind of composition we 
find in time continuous systems. In the former, time is portrayed as a dimension that 
is neutral, i.e., time exists independently of the events or states, or processes, etc., that 
occur in time, while time plays a fundamental role in the latter. For example, in their 
discussion of the role of the body (or, embodiment) in cognition, Ballard and 
colleagues say the following:  
 
“When the production of intelligent behavior by the body-brain system is taken 
into account, the constraints of time and space intervene to limit what is 
possible.” (Ballard et al. 1997, p. 723)  
 
If I am correct, the synchronic composition view treats time only as a specification of 
the proposition “the Xs compose Y” as taking place at a time. Thus, the locution “P is 
v at t” implies that the expression in place of P refers to a proposition (e.g., the Xs 
compose Y), the expression in place of v refers to a truth value (it is either true or 
false that P), and the expression in place of t refers to a particular time instant such 
that on the standard view “P is v at t”.  
To proceed further with this temporality-driven critique of synchronically 
formulated composition, and to hook it up with the discussion of CA, what we need, 
in the context of CA, is positive empirical evidence that time really matters for just 
how and for which processes are assembled in order to solve a given problem
7
. That 
is, we shall look at an example that Clark argues shows the “balanced use of a set of 
potentially highly heterogeneous resources assembled on the spot to solve a given 
problem.” (2008, p. 13)  
 
5. Cognitive assembly over short-term temporal frequencies 
 
Consider, then, Clark’s employment of a series of experiments conducted by Gray & 
Fu (2004) targeting how patterns of interactive behavior emerges at the level of 
embodiment and how soft-constraints – at the embodiment level – determine which of 
the possible strategies – for solving a given problem – are most likely to be selected 
given the problem or task environment. 
                                                        
7 One might object to my claim that dynamical cognitive science is incompatible with 
tenseless accounts of time, in that, you can account for change in tenseless terms as 
Russell famously showed. Briefly, what it is for an entity E to undergo change is for E 
to have a property X at t and a property Y at t1 rather than X at t1. But, notice, if we 
want to understand (i) the evolvement of the system from t to t1, and (b) how that 
particular temporal evolvement gives rise to a property difference in E from t to t1, 
then a synchronic explanation comes up short.  
 
A few points of clarification: as other researchers in embodied cognition (see e.g., 
Ballard et al. 1997), Gray & Fu take the notion “embodiment level” to refer to the 
timescales over which several neural and bodily operations begin to cohere into 
certain patterns of activity that compose or assemble the bases of interactive behavior. 
These operations include what Gray & Fu refer to as elementary cognitive, 
perceptual, and action operations that have a typical time-course of 300 milliseconds 
(2004, p. 362) Thus, in this case, and with respect to the TSCQ, the timescales over 
which processes operate when they jointly compose or assemble some short-term 
cognitive products to solve a given problem is the short-term timescale of 300 
milliseconds it takes various neural processes to combine with each other to form a 
specific “microstrategy” (cf. Gray & Fu 2004, p. 364) – where “microstrategy” refers 
to patterns of behavior invoked to accomplish a cognitive task. Such microstrategies, 
Gray & Fu stress, are softly constrained, suggesting that there are many possible 
routes rather than just one (hard constrained option) by which various neural/bodily 
processes may combine or come together in order to solve a given cognitive task 
(Gray & Fu 2004, p. 361).    
In the first set of experiments (Gray & Fu 2004), subjects were presented with the 
task of having to program an on-screen simulation of a VCR control panel. The idea 
of the experiment was to manipulate the time-course and time-cost involved in 
accessing the information required to program a VCR in order to assess whether the 
task environment facilitates or discourages the use of  “knowledge in-the-world for 
knowledge in-the-head.” (Gray & Fu 2004, p. 364)  
In the experiment subjects were divided into three groups. In the first group (the 
Free-Access condition), the information was clearly visible in front of the user so that 
she freely could access the information via saccadic eye movement. In the second 
group (the Gray-Box condition), the window was partly visible, although the required 
information (about channel, start time, etc.) was covered with a gray box. To uncover 
the information the user had to remove the gray box via a mouse click on the gray 
box. The final group (the Memory-Test condition), who, unlike the others, had 
previously memorized all the information required, had to remove the gray box and 
type in the necessary information. In order to determine to time-course and time-cost 
involved in each of these three conditions, Gray & Fu analyzed two components: first, 
the time needed for perceptual-motor access to the information; and second, the time 
needed for memory retrieval (see Fig. 1). What Gray & Fu found was that time costs 
of information retrieval, measured in milliseconds, are what determine the 
combination of processes (biological memory, motor actions, shifts of attention, etc.) 
assembled to solve the problem. As Clark puts it:  
 
“[The] subjects settled on whatever strategy yielded (at that phase of the 
programming) the least cost (measured by time) information retrieval. In fact, 
they did this even when the fastest mix of resources sacrificed perfect 
knowledge in the world for imperfect knowledge in the head. Only when the in-
the-world data could be accessed with less effort (measured by time) than the 
data stored in biological memory was it recruited and were calls to the external 
store “built into” the dominant strategy.” (2008, p. 119) 
 
Estimates (in ms) of perceptual-motor and memory retrieval effort by condition 
 
Condition       
 
Perceptual-motor access Memory retrieval 
Free-Access 
Gray-Box 
Memory-Test 
500 
1,000-1,500 
1,000-1,500 
500-1,000 
500-1,000 
100-300 
 
Fig. 1 Overview of the time needed to access the information on each condition. 
Estimates are in milliseconds (adapted from Gray & Fu 2004, p. 368).  
 
If Gray & Fu are correct, what this example clearly indicates is that psychological 
phenomena of using softly constrained patterns of information retrieval cannot be 
appropriately explained without (a) an appeal to richly temporal processes, and (b) 
insofar as various cognitive, perceptual, and motor elements combine to jointly 
compose such transient microstrategies. Thus, the timescales over which the Xs 
operate when they jointly compose Y fail to accommodate the temporally restricted 
assumption that the Xs do so at right this instant t. Indeed, rendering the verb 
“compose” in “the Xs compose Y” either tenseless (as the non-presentist would insist 
on) or in present tense (as the presentist would insist on) makes little sense in this 
dynamical and time continuous domain.  
First, as Clark mentions, temporal “cost-benefit trade-offs are said to provide a soft 
constraint […] on the mix of motoric, perceptual, and biomemory-based resources 
that will, other things being equal, be automatically recruited to perform a given 
information-processing task on a given occasion.” (2008, p. 120) That is, Gray & Fu 
show that the Free-Access group favor perceptual-motor access over memory 
retrieval, whereas the Memory-Test group favor memory retrieval strategies given 
that that route of retrieval is much faster than perceptual-motor access. It would seem, 
then, that the timescales over which various cognitive, perceptual, and motor elements 
combine to jointly compose transient microstrategies are ineliminably context-
sensitive and will consequently differ accordingly to the constraints of the task 
environment. That is, it would seem to be impossible to require that each case of the 
verb “compose” in the expression “the Xs compose Y” must be true or false once and 
for all, that is, independently of time and context.  
Second, processes preclude instantiation at a particular time instant t, in the sense 
that what is it to be a process – that is, what it is to persist as a process – involves, 
necessarily, unfolding over time (cf. Hofweber & Velleman 2011). Therefore, even on 
the short-term timescales of neural operations – note also our discussion of the action 
potential earlier – neural processes cannot be completely and wholly present at any 
single instant. That is because neural processes, like processes in general, are 
temporally extended in nature. For my purposes, then, the real power of the example 
discussed by Clark is that it shows that even on the short-term timescales over which 
neural and bodily processes operate, it is ontologically diachronic all the way down.  
We have here a consequence for those involved in the debate over the process of 
CA in EC and for metaphysicians with a synchronic persuasion. First, and to repeat 
what I said in section 2, insofar as Clark states that it is the processes that operate 
here-and-now that orchestrate the assembly of hybrid, distributed cognitive wholes, 
this claim really boils down to saying that it is the short-term timescale of bodily and 
neural processes that during that period of time orchestrated the assembly process of 
some distributed cognitive whole, and should not be mistaken as genuine evidence for 
the processes actually assembling some distributed cognitive whole at a time instant t. 
As I understand Clark’s position – or, the best way to interpret Clark’s insistence on 
the timescale of the here-and-now – is precisely that it is the processes that unfold 
over short-term, but varied, timescales that assemble or compose distributed cognitive 
processes and/or systems (Clark 2011). Second, if the metaphysics of composition is 
to apply to dynamical processes involved in the process of CA, then the synchronic 
account of composition is ill equipped. Thus, the process of CA must be stated 
entirely such that it does not implicate assumptions about composition as 
ontologically synchronic.  
 
6. Cognitive assembly – distributed over multiple timescales and multiple 
resources 
 
So far I have argued that any adequate analysis of the TSCQ in the context of CA 
should accept a diachronic conception of composition. I wish now to examine what is 
presupposed in the argument for the process of CA provided by Clark, namely that it 
is only the processes operating here-and-now that are responsible for the assembly of 
distributed cognitive processes and/or systems in conjunction with the claim that 
those processes responsible for such assembly are bodily and neural processes.  
As Clark explicitly states: “My own targets, in the discussion in [Supersizing the 
Mind] of cognitive assembly, were the processes operating in the here-and-now.” 
(2011, p. 459) And as Clark specifies the kinds of processes in operation in the here-
and-now:  
 
“It is indeed primarily (though not solely) the biological organism that, courtesy 
especially of its potent neural apparatus, spins and maintains (or more 
minimally selects and exploits) the webs of additional structure that then form 
parts of the machinery that accomplishes its own cognizing.” (2008, p. 123) 
 
There are two assumptions at work in Clark’s project. The first assumption is that 
only processes operating here-and-now (or right now) are responsible for the 
assembly of distributed cognitive processes or systems. The second assumption is that 
the processes most directly responsible for such assembly are bodily and/or neural 
processes. With respect to the example above, these two assumptions highlight that it 
is the short-term temporal frequencies at the embodiment level, made up of 
perceptual, motor, and cognitive processes, which primarily compose higher-level 
cognitive products.  
However, this combination is not the only coherent and live option in the 
literature. That is, if we call Clark’s first assumption for “A”, and call the second 
assumption “B”, then these assumptions leave open any of the three coherent possible 
combinations: (i) accept (A) and (B) – this is Clark’s position in his (2008); (ii) accept 
(A) but deny (B); and (iii) deny both (A) and (B). That is:  
 
1. Only processes operating here-and-now are responsible for CA, and such processes 
are bodily and neural processes. 
 
2. Only processes operating here-and-now are responsible for CA, but this does not 
prevent non-neural and non-bodily processes from significantly contributing to the 
process of CA.  
 
3. Neither processes operating here-and-now nor bodily and neural processes are 
primarily responsible for CA.  
 
All three of these combinations have seen defenders in the contemporary literature, 
although I suspect that whether or not there really are exponents of the third 
combination depends on interpretations of key selected passages. For example, Clark 
(2011) has attacked Hutchins’ “Hypothesis of Enculturated Cognition” (Hutchins 
2011) for presupposing that “cultural practices are sufficient to account for all the 
crucial work of cognitive assembly.” (2011, p. 459; italics in original) And as Clark 
specifies: “I think Hutchins is failing to attend to important differences concerning the 
shape and timescale of the processes concerned.” (2011, p. 459) By stating that 
Hutchins is failing to attend to different aspects concerning timescales, Clark means:  
 
“Hutchins response might be that we should simply reject the conceptual 
separation between the processes operating on […] various timescales. […]. 
That is how I read his key suggestion that “both the constraints of cultural 
practices and the malleable internal microdemons can be seen as elements of a 
single adaptive system”. But while I agree that these are indeed (also) elements 
of a single long-term adaptive system, that does nothing to diminish the 
conceptual separation between the long-term evolution of cultural practices, the 
medium-term effects of my immersion in such practices, and the short-term 
processes by means of which my brain then participates in what (from an 
extended mind perspective) are new hybrid cognitive routines that productively 
criss-cross brain, body, and world.” (2011, p. 460) 
 
On this interpretation of Hutchins’ position, it appears that Hutchins endorses the 
third combination, namely that neither processes operating in the here-and-now nor 
bodily and neural processes are what primarily assembles distributed cognitive 
wholes. Hutchins himself states that one way to avoid the option of combining (A) 
and (B) is “to abandon the assumption that the biological brain is the essential 
element. Doing so, of course, requires that one look elsewhere for the apparently 
impartial forces that assemble cognitive systems.” (2011, p. 439) As Hutchins 
proposes: “A good start to understanding this process of recruitment would be to 
notice the role of cultural practices in the orchestration of soft-assembly of extended 
cognitive systems.” (2011, p. 440)  
A worry about the third combination, however, is that the general formulation of 
this combo allows for the following claim: that certain evolutionary conditions for 
some present cognitive functioning (e.g., from 100,000 years ago) could be actively 
orchestrating the process of CA here-and-now. I am not aware of any philosophers 
that have defended such a suggestion but it is within the logical possibilities of the 
general formulation of the third option. 
However, in other passages, Hutchins’ own position is much closer to the second 
option. Clark mentions this possibility as well, as he says: “For as Hutchins himself 
says, it is only the ‘special super-flexible medium’ of the brain that allows such 
shared practices to come to orchestrate human learning and response in the first 
place.” (2011, p. 459; italics in original) Or, as Hutchins states:  
 
“In this perspective, the brain appears as a special super-flexible medium that 
can form functional subsystems that establish and maintain dynamic co-
ordination among constraints imposed by the world of cultural activity, by the 
body, and by the brain’s own prior organization.” (2011, p. 445)  
 
Thus, depending on how one interprets Hutchins’ position, it is possible to place him 
in either option two or three. Now, even though I say that all three combinations are 
coherent, it should be clear that any one of these is not free of difficulty. In addition to 
Clark’s criticism of Hutchins’ hypothesis of enculturated cognition, Hutchins has 
argued that the first combination – the one Clark opts for in much of his latest work 
(Clark 2008, 2011) – is problematic, in the sense that endorsing the view that only 
bodily and neural processes are responsible for the process of CA excludes from view 
that much of the “heavy-lifting” – as Hutchins in fond of calling it – in the assembly 
of distributed cognitive ecologies is performed by cultural practices that unfold over 
longer timescales than those of the here-and-now.  
A similar sort of ambiguity is present in Clark’s authorship, especially when one 
compares some of Clark’s earlier work such as Being There (1997) as well as articles 
such as “Beyond the Flesh: Lessons from a Mole Cricket” (2005a) and “Word, Niche 
and Super-Niche: How Language Makes Minds Matter More” (2005b) and his latest 
book Supersizing the Mind (2008). In fact, one may also locate a similar kind of 
ambiguity just by reading through his (2008). The ambiguity consists in the 
following: whereas Clark in his earlier works is much closer to the combination 
“accept (A) but deny (B)”, he is much more in favor of, as we have seen, the 
combination “accept (A) and (B)” in his latest work. Consider, for example, the 
following combination of quotes: first, “[my] own targets, in the discussion in 
[Supersizing the Mind] of cognitive assembly, were the processes operating in the 
here-and-now.” (2011, p. 459) And as Clark specifies where those processes are 
primarily located: “It is indeed primarily (though not solely) the biological organism 
that, courtesy especially of its potent neural apparatus, spins and maintains (or more 
minimally selects and exploits) the webs of additional structure that then form parts of 
the machinery that accomplishes its own cognizing” (2008, p. 123) So, here Clark is 
explicit about endorsing option one – that is, the acceptance of (A) and (B).  
But, consider, then, the following couple of quotes, the first from his (2008) and 
the second from his (1997): first, “[this] is not to deny, of course, that much of the 
spinning is done by social groups of organisms spread out over long swaths of 
history.” (2008, p. 243; footnote 18) And second: “[The] brain in its bodily context, 
interacting with a complex world of physical and social structures. These external 
structures both constrain and augment problem-solving activities of the basic brain, 
whose role is largely to support a succession of iterated, local, pattern-completing 
responses.” (1997, p. 191) Thus, whereas the first set of quotes puts Clark squarely in 
the first option, this latter set of quotes puts him firmly in the second option.  
It is certainly true that one way to read these ambiguities in both Clark’s and 
Hutchins’ work is that they indicate that not any one of the three options can be 
defended on metaphysical ground. That is, it is an empirical question just how often 
and how much of the assembly work is performed through the combination of (A) and 
(B) or (A) and not (B). It is an empirical issue how much and how often the 
integration is orchestrated internally and how much and how often the integration is 
assembled externally. This, I suspect, is the correct way by which to understand the 
ambiguity present in both Clark and Hutchins concerning the process of CA.  
However, this raises a different question, namely might there be reasons for 
favoring one option or combination over the other even though the two combinations 
are not mutually exclusive per se? I think that there are such reasons, especially 
reasons that lend support to the combination “accept (A) but deny (B)”. One worry 
with the first combination is that it threatens to the screen-off the fact that even in the 
here-and-now, history and culture are always already embedded as well as carried 
along in the practices and artifacts individuals are engaging with (Menary 2007; 
Sutton 2008, 2010; see also Haugeland 2002; Lave & Wegner 1991). Indeed, the 
option of taking the second combination on-board is much more in line with a 
distinctive third-wave of EC theorizing (cf. Sutton 2010; Cash 2013; Kirchhoff 2012). 
That is, even in the here-and-now, across the short-term timescales of hours, minutes, 
seconds, and so on, the process of EC is not primarily driven/orchestrated by bodily 
or neural processes but it also significantly morphed and sculptured by socially 
embedded and culturally transmitted practices. 
As I have shown, Clark’s position is (in certain works) consistent with the second 
option, thereby bringing Clark into contact with a third-wave of EC research. Because 
of this, I shall consider a case study discussed by Clark on how expert bartenders, 
when faced with a multiple drink order in noisy and crowded environments are able to 
successfully solve the problem
8
. Since Clark articulates this example within the 
framework of niche construction (NC) (cf. Laland et al. 2000), I start by giving a brief 
introduction to the central tenets of NC. NC, as defined by Laland et al. (2000), refers 
to:  
 
“[The] activities, choices and metabolic processes of organisms, through which 
they define, choose, modify and partly create their own niches. […]. For 
example, to varying degrees, organisms choose their own habitats, mates, and 
                                                        
8
 The actual case study is due to Beach (1988).  
resources and construct important components of their local environments such 
as nests, holes, burrows, paths, webs, dams, and chemical environments.” 
(2000, pp. 132-33) 
 
Organisms adapt to environmental pressures. But organisms also construct, alter, and 
modify their own environmental niches. Some make burrows, webs, shelters, and 
other resources. Earthworms are a good example of what we might call pragmatic 
engineering. Earthworms engage in burrowing activities, often resulting in a 
transformation of the structure and chemistry of the soil in which they live (Laland et 
al. 2000, p. 134). This burrowing activity is important because earthworms, prior to 
their presence on land, were originally aquatic organisms (Laland 2004, p. 321). As 
Laland says: only by “co-opting the soils that they inhabit and the tunnels they build 
to serve as accessory kidneys that compensate for their poor structural adaptation 
[…],” (2004, p. 321) can earthworms tackle the physiological demands of a different 
water- and salt-balance on land.  
Many organisms not only alter and transform their environmental niches 
pragmatically. Much niche construction is importantly a mode of epistemic 
engineering, in the sense that active niche-constructors modify and alter the 
informational character of the environment (Sterelny 2010, p. 470). For instance, ants 
lay scent trails between nest and food source. Humans off-load information “onto” the 
environment so as to ease the burdens on “internal” memory processing (Donald 
1991). Other organisms, like hawks, simply choose the best spot from which to 
maximize the view of their hunting territory. In a comprehensive study on the 
“intelligent use of space,” Kirsh argues that rearranging spatial relations between 
environmental resources transforms the problem solving space by reducing the 
descriptive complexity of the task environment (1995, 2009). Especially in the human 
lineage, the ramification of epistemic engineering is the establishment of a 
cumulatively constructed cognitive-developmental niche (Sterelny 2003, 2010).  
Epistemic (and pragmatic) engineering is not only cognition-enhancing in the 
heat of some problem-solving scenario, since some modifications to the physical and 
informational environment are transmitted downstream to the following generation. 
As Sterelny argues, “cumulative downstream epistemic engineering” implies 
transmission of both socio-cultural structures and ecological and technical know-how 
or expertise enabling the transmission and acquisition of new knowledge (2010, p. 
470). In all these cases of NC, both pragmatic and epistemic varieties, what matters, 
as Laland et al. (2000) emphasize, is that the activity of NC leads to new feedback 
cycles.  
In the standard cases of NC, those feedback cycles run over evolutionary 
timescales. However, for Clark’s purposes, what really matters is that “this whole 
process has a direct analogue within lifetime learning.” 2005a, p. 256) As Clark 
states:  
 
“Here, the feedback cycles alter and transform the processes of individual and 
cultural learning. For example, both educational practices and human-built 
structures (and artifacts) are passed on from generation to generation in ways 
that dramatically alter the fitness landscape for individual lifetime learning.” 
(2005a, p. 256) 
 
The example that Clark considers is how an expert bartender, when faced with a 
multiple drink order in very noisy and crowded circumstances, is capable of solving 
the problem successfully. Or, alternatively, just how learning within a pre-structured 
niche with cultural practices and differently shaped glasses, makes it possible for a 
novice bartender to perform competently. In lifetime learning, or across 
developmental timescales, the expert bartenders learn how to line up differently 
shaped glasses in spatial sequences, which, in turn, correspond to the temporal 
sequence of drinks orders. As Clark states: “The problem of remembering what drink 
to prepare next is thus transformed, as a result of learning within this pre-structured 
niche, into the problem of perceiving different shapes and associating each shape with 
a kind of drink.” (2005a, p. 256; italics added) In this sense, the cultural practices of 
knowing what to do, and how to do it, when facing a multiple drink order are shaped 
by the niche constructing activity of previous individuals, and these practices 
constrain our epistemic access to the world by orchestrating what to attend to and see 
when so attending (cf. Hutchins 2008). This resonates deeply with Haugeland’s idea 
that normative practices have a certain kind of “normative gravity” (2002, p. 32). In 
becoming normalized in the practice of bartending, if we take Haugeland’s view, 
what is normalized is not so much behaviors but rather dispositions to behave. But 
even if normal practices or behaviors might never be exactly alike, they are 
sufficiently alike to be within the same “orbit”. Thus, according to Haugeland: “when 
an individual’s dispositions stray from producing behavior within these orbits (that is, 
types [of normative practices]), they are ‘pulled back in’.“ (2002, p. 32) Another way 
of articulating this idea is due to the patterned practice approach developed by 
Roepstorff et al (2010). As they mention: “From the inside of a [cultural] practice, 
certain models of expectancy come to be established, and the patterns, which over 
time emerge from these practices, guide perception as well as action.” (2010, p. 1056) 
Here it is not primarily bodily and neural processes that compose a bartender’s 
ability to get the job done but rather neural processes in coordination with normative, 
cultural practices that jointly come together to assemble such abilities.  
 
7. Implications 
 
The combination of ontological diachronicity with the TSCQ implies that whenever 
the statement “the processes involved in the process of CA are those processes 
operating in the here-and-now” is made, it follows that we must understand this 
statement as expressing “the processes involved in the process of CA are those 
processes operating in the here-and-now during that period of time”. This particular 
view, it seems to me, is the implicit view of several philosophers of cognitive science 
as well as some cognitive scientists themselves (see e.g., Ballard et al. 1997; Beer 
2000; Chemero 2009; Clark 1998b; Kirchhoff 2013; Spivey 2007; Varela et al. 2001; 
and others). One important implication this has for any synchronic notion of 
composition – such as the SCQ – is that not only is it ill fitted to analyze temporally 
complex phenomena; it can never be made to analyze such temporal phenomena 
simpliciter.  
Once we make room for a robust diachronic account of the circumstances under 
which entities of different kinds assemble or compose another entity, and once room 
has been made for the pivotal role of cultural practices in this process of assembly or 
composition, this requires (non-trivially) that we look beyond the system made up of 
the individual agent and artifact. Notice that there is nothing special about endorsing 
option 1 above: only processes operating in the here-and-now are responsible for the 
process of CA and such processes are primarily bodily and neural processes. Indeed, 
prominent advocates of this view include Clark (2008, 2011) and Clark & Chalmers 
(1998). As we saw in introduction, this particular version of EC is what both Menary 
(2010) and Sutton (2010) refer to as first-wave EC. Defenders of first-wave EC 
ground their arguments for EC on the ideas that (i) external artifacts are recruited into 
the cognitive systems of an individual due to the right kind of causal coupling, and (ii) 
functional similarity between the causal roles of internal and external physical 
occupiers. If the arguments for EC focuses on how artifacts are integrated into an 
individual’s cognitive system, then it is not surprising that first-wave versions of EC 
usually adopt an account of the process of CA along the lines of option 1. That is, in 
Hutchins’ words, “if culture is reduced to a collection of lifeless artifacts” (2011a, p. 
444), then the active dynamic processes involved in the process of CA must be bodily 
and neural. But, if we cultural practices may be conceived of as playing a central role 
in the process of CA, then it follows that some of the active dynamic processes 
involved in the process of CA lies beyond the system made up of the individual agent 
and artifact. If this turns out to be correct, then what we have is an account of the 
process of CA that grounds Sutton’s gesture towards a third-wave version of EC: a 
version “which dissolves individuals into peculiar loci of coordination and 
coalescence among multiple structured media [and practices]”. (2010, p. 213)  
I wish to finish this paper by considering whether it is possible to apply this 
metaphysical contribution to the debate over the process of CA to settle any disputes 
in the literature. I think that this is entirely possible. Consider, for example, how 
Hutchins attempts to push Clark into a strictly neural-oriented position with regards to 
the process of CA by exploiting an apparent bias in the phrase “on the spot”. As 
Hutchins says:  
 
“According to Clark, this exploitation happens “on the spot,” but the constraints 
that determine which resources are exploited and how they are related to one 
another is not entirely formed “on the spot”. The “on the spot” phrase highlights 
the opportunistic nature of cognitive systems. However, without additional 
discussion, this wording may also bias the solution toward the biological brain 
by isolating the activity from the context of cultural historical processes.” 
(2011, p. 441)  
 
One cause for concern about Hutchins’ interpretation of the phrase “on the spot” is 
that there is nothing about the phrase “on the spot” that conceptually entails a 
commitment to the view that it is the brain that is the most active element in the 
assembly of distributed cognitive products. An example will make this more concrete. 
Consider, again, a passage from Hutchins:  
 
Cultural practices shape active sensing and ways of seeing the world by 
highlighting what to attend to and what to see when so attending. Clark 
mentions the activity of seeing a star. A far more interesting example is seeing a 
constellation, since a constellation exists only by virtue of someone enacting it 
via a cultural practice that allocates visual attention in a particular way.” (2011, 
p. 441)  
 
Whichever processes combine to produce the capacity to see a star constellation do so 
on the spot – on the timescales of seconds or, perhaps, minutes. The question is: over 
which other timescales would such processes be active? 
Instead of juxtaposing the short-term timescales and long-term timescales (e.g., 
historical time-scales), Hutchins would be better off arguing that there is no problem 
with depicting the process of CA as unfolding over the short-term timescales of the 
here-and-now, provided that you leave room for the central roles of cultural practices 
(or, history embedded in those practices) in the processes that unfold here-and-now. 
Insofar as the meaning of “now” is such that it may, in the right circumstances, 
include a dynamical interval of time, and insofar as the cultural practices within 
which the cognitive task is carried out unfolds within such a dynamical interval of 
time, then cultural practices may be part of the processes assembling some cognitive 
ability. That is the real point that one will be able to make by opting for combination 
(A) and not (B) above. Consequently, Hutchins cannot appeal to the notion “on the 
spot” in order to assert that Clark privileges the brain in the process of CA, since the 
meaning of “on the spot” is contingent – as I have argued – on the time and place of 
the utterance.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
What I hope to have shown in this paper is that when considering the process of CA, 
that is, when we analyze over which timescales certain processes combine to compose 
distributed cognitive products, there is no ontologically synchronic instant t at which 
that is possible. I wish to finish this paper by pointing out that metaphysical analysis 
cannot settle the question over which timescales the processes involved in the process 
of CA are predominantly active. This is a matter of empirical investigation. However, 
by scrutinizing the metaphysics of what it means for certain Xs to compose a certain 
Y now, it is possible, I think, to turn what might look like a metaphysical dispute into 
a productive recipe for empirical research and to set certain constraints for how such 
research must be carried out.  
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